Argumentative Patterns in The Justification of Judicial Decisions A Translation of Robert Alexy’s Concept of Weighing and Balancing in Terms af a General Argumentative Pattern of Legal Justification

In this contribution I explain how Alexy’s ideas about weighing and balancing can be translated and elaborated in terms of general argumentative patterns in the justification of judicial decisions. This implies that I extend Alexy’s general theory of legal argumentation by specifying how the argumentative obligations a court that gives a decision on the basis of weighing and balancing can be characterized in terms of a general argumentative pattern that is prototypical for this form of decision-making in hard cases. First, I answer the question what, from the perspective of a general theory of legal argumentation, the underlying (hidden) assumptions are that must be made explicit in terms of elements of a justification that is based on weighing and balancing. Then I answer the question how these underlying assumptions can be reconstructed in terms of prototypical argumentative patterns that make explicit the argumentative obligations of courts in certain types of hard cases that involve weighing and balancing.