- Bidding to give: an experimental comparison of auctions for charity
- Number of pages
- Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
- Mimeo, University of Amsterdam
- Document type
- Working paper
- Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
- Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
- We experimentally compare three mechanisms used to raise money for charities: first-price winner-pay auctions, first-price
all-pay auctions, and lotteries. We stay close to the
characteristics of most charity auctions by using an environment with incomplete information and independent private values. Our results support theoretical predictions by showing that the all-pay format raises substantially higher revenue than the other mechanisms.
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