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Results: 300
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  • Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Jensen, H. (2003). Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact. Journal of International Economics, 61(1), 187-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00083-1
  • Beetsma, R. M. W. J., Bettendorf, L., & Broer, P. (2003). The budgeting and economic consequences of ageing in the Netherlands. Economic Modelling, 20(5), 987-1013. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-9993(02)00062-7
  • Bartelsman, E. J., & Beetsma, R. M. W. J. (2003). Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries. Journal of Public Economics, 87(9/10), 2225-2252. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00018-X
  • Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Jensen, H. (2003). Structural Convergence under Reversible and Irreversable Monetary Unification. Journal of International Money and Finance, 22(3), 417-439. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-5606(03)00016-0
  • Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Bovenberg, A. L. (2003). Inflation Targets and Public Debt Accumulation. European Journal of Political Economy, 19, 1-15.
  • Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Jensen, H. (2003). Contingent Defecit SAnctions and Moral Hazard with a Stability Pact. Journal of International Economics, 60, 187-208.
  • Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Vermeylen, K. (2003). Clustering optimale valutagebieden en macro-economisch beleid. In S. Brakman, & J. H. Garretsen (Eds.), Locatie en concurrentie (Preadviezen van de Koninklijke Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde; No. 2003). KVS.
  • Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Bovenberg, A. L. (2003). Strategic debt accumulation in a heterogeneous monetary union. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(1), 1-15.
  • Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Jensen, H. (2003). Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: a comment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35(1), 129-136. https://doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2003.0001
  • Open Access
    Beetsma, R., & Jensen, H. (2003). Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact: Unpublished technical appendices. University of Amsterdam and CEPR. http://www1.feb.uva.nl/pp/bin/564fulltext.pdf
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