Search results

  • Full text

  • Document type

    • Publication year

  • Organisation

Results: 144
Number of items: 144
  • van Ophem, J. C. M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1997). Sequential and Simultaneous Logit: A Nested Model. Empirical Economics, 22, 131-152. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01188174
  • Schram, A. J. H. C. (1997). Do People care about Democracy? Public Choice, 91, 49-51. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004925017684
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Strategic behaviour in public good games. (TI discussion paper; No. 96-111/1). Tinbergen Institute.
  • Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Why people vote: experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 17, 417-442. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(96)00022-0
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Quantal response models in step-level public good games. (TI discussion paper; No. 96-20/1). Tinbergen Institute.
  • Olson, M., Schram, A. J. H. C., & van Winden, F. A. A. M. (1996). De veiling van etherfrequenties door de overheid. CREED.
  • Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., & Schram, A. (1996). Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods. Economic Journal, 106(437), 817-845. https://doi.org/10.2307/2235360
  • Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Voter turnout as a participation game: an experimental investigation. International Journal of Game Theory, 25, 385-406. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425263
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1996). Belief learning in pubic goods games: sophisticated strategics versus naive bayesians. (TI discussion paper 95-132). Afdeling Algemene Economie.
  • Offerman, T. J. S. (1996). Beliefs and decision rules in public good games. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam]. UvA.
Page 14 of 15