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Results: 115
Number of items: 115
  • Sloof, R. (1999). Campaign contributions and the desirability of full disclosure laws. Economics and Politics, (11), 83-107. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00054
  • Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1999). Promotion rules and skill acquisition: An experimental study. (SCHOLAR Working Paper; No. WP 07/00). University of Amsterdam. http://www1.fee.uva.nl/scholar/wp/wp07-99.pdf
  • Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1999). Promotion rules and skill acquisition: An experimental study. (CREED Working Paper). University of Amsterdam.
  • Sloof, R., Sonnemans, J. H., & Oosterbeek, H. (1999). Specific investments, hold-up, and the outside option principle: an experimental study. (CREED Working Paper). University of Amsterdam.
  • Sloof, R. (1998). Game-theoretic models of the political influence of interest groups. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Sloof, R. (1997). Interest group influence and the delegation of police authority. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 1997-069/1). Tinbergen Institute.
  • Sloof, R. (1997). Game-theoretic Models of the Political influence of Interst Groups. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam]. Thesis Publishers.
  • Sloof, R. (1997). Lobbying when the Decisionmaker can acquire independent information. Public Choice, 91(2), 199-207. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004964105609
  • Sloof, R. (1997). Competitive Lobbying for a Legislators Vote. Social Choice and Welfare, 14(3), 449-464. https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050078
  • Sloof, R. (1997). Campaign Contributions and the Desirability of Full Disclosure Laws. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 1997-068/1). Tinbergen Institute.
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