Search results

  • Full text

  • Document type

    • Publication year

  • Organisation

Results: 141
Number of items: 141
  • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2006). Using first-price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(3), 555-581. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.011
  • Open Access
    Offerman, T. (2006). Economisch design. (Oratiereeks). Vossiuspers UvA.
  • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2003). Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values. Economic Journal, 113, 598-614. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00142
  • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2003). Winner's Curse without Overbidding. European Economic Review, 47, 625-644. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00290-8
  • Offerman, T. J. S. (2002). Hurting Hurts More Than Helping Helps. European Economic Review, 46, 1423-1437. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00176-3
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J., & Sonnemans, J. H. (2002). Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment. The Review of Economic Studies, 96, 973-997.
  • Guth, W., Offerman, T. J. S., Potters, J., Strobel, M., & Verbon, H. A. A. (2002). Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers? The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(4), 587-604. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00303
  • Cox, J., Offerman, T. J. S., Olson, M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2002). Competition For vs On the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment. International Economic Review, 43, 709-736. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00032
  • Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. J. S. (2002). Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study. The American Economic Review, 92(3), 625-643. https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280260136435
  • Open Access
    Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. (2002). The Amsterdam auction. CREED, University of Amsterdam.
Page 11 of 15