The heterogeneous politics of infrastructure Claims of authority in Accra’s drainage
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| Publication date | 11-2023 |
| Journal | Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space |
| Volume | Issue number | 41 | 7 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1459-1473 |
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| Abstract |
In many parts of the world, the modernist ideal of centralised and networked infrastructure provided by the state remains just that – an ideal. Instead, the reality is a patchwork of infrastructural solutions engineered by both state and private actors. While critical studies have highlighted how states use infrastructure projects to legitimize their authority, how do infrastructure projects shape relations between the state and urban residents when the state is not the sole actor in building and maintaining infrastructure? Drawing on scholarship on the socio-material dynamics of infrastructure, this article examines infrastructure’s politics in Accra’s drainage system. Studying these material interventions shows that drainage is politicised with state actors, aspiring politicians, and urban residents advancing and evaluating performances of authority in relation to this infrastructure. This politicization of drainage infrastructure reproduces patterns of urban socio-economic inequality. As residents experience the consequences of each other’s actions, they recognize the need for a centralised approach to tackle drainage problems and express a desire for the state to assume responsibility. Although ‘heterogeneous infrastructure configurations’ more accurately captures the reality on the ground in rapidly growing cities such as Accra, this analysis of everyday infrastructural politics helps explain why expectations of centrally organized drainage infrastructure persist.
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| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1177/23996544231190082 |
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