Structural Distortions and Decentralized Fiscal Policies in EMU
| Authors |
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| Publication date | 2001 |
| Publisher | CEPR Discussion Paper Series |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract |
The combination of discretionary monetary policy, labour market distortions
and nominal wage rigidity yields an inflation bias as monetary policy tries to
exploit nominal wage contracts to address labour market distortions. Although
an inflation target eliminates this inflation bias, it creates a conflict between
monetary policy and discretionary fiscal policy if fiscal policy is set at a higher
frequency than nominal wages. To avoid the associated excessive
accumulation of public debt, ceilings on public debt are called for. If countries
differ substantially in terms of structural distortions or economic shocks, country-specific debt targets must complement uniform debt ceilings in order to prevent decentralized fiscal authorities from employing debt policy strategically. JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61, E62 |
| Document type | Working paper |
| Published at | http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=2851&Previous.x=0&Previous.y=0 |
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