The Double Democratic Bind: Challenges to Enacting Mandates and Combating Misinformation
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| Publication date | 02-2024 |
| Journal | Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law |
| Volume | Issue number | 49 | 1 |
| Pages (from-to) | 189-215 |
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| Abstract |
Context: Wealthy countries vary considerably in terms of how well they have been able to inoculate their populations against COVID-19. In particular, democracies have been constrained in their abilities to implement vaccine mandates, given enshrined protections of civil liberties and individual freedom in such regimes. While scholars have begun addressing the democratic constraint on vaccine mandates, less attention has been paid to the additional challenges democracies face in constraining the spread of vaccine misinformation – and in particular misinformation spread online.
Methods: Our study combines large-N cross-country analysis with a case study of Germany to illustrate the “double bind” that democracies face when it comes to containing both the spread of disease as well as the spread of misinformation through social media. Findings: The cross-national analysis confirms that democracies have been less likely to enact vaccine mandates, and have also been relatively more hesitant to restrict what people can see and share online. The case study of Germany highlights the normative and procedural constraints underlying such decisions. Conclusions: These findings show that resources are often not the binding constraint to effective disease control, and raise questions regarding the ability of high-income democracies to respond effectively to future public health emergencies. |
| Document type | Article |
| Note | In special issue: The Political Economy of Vaccines during the COVID-19 Pandemic. |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-10910233 |
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