Nash social welfare in multiagent resource allocation
| Authors |
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| Publication date | 2010 |
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| Book title | Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce : Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets |
| Book subtitle | AAMAS Workshop, AMEC 2009, Budapest, Hungary, May 12, 2009, and IJCAI Workshop, TADA 2009, Pasadena, CA, USA, July 13, 2009 : selected and revised papers |
| ISBN |
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| ISBN (electronic) |
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| Series | Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing |
| Event | 11th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC-2009), Budapest, Hungary |
| Pages (from-to) | 117-131 |
| Publisher | Berlin: Springer |
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| Abstract |
We study different aspects of the multiagent resource allocation problem when the objective is to find an allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare, the product of the utilities of the individual agents. The Nash solution is an important welfare criterion that combines efficiency and fairness considerations. We show that the problem of finding an optimal outcome is NP-hard for a number of different languages for representing agent preferences; we establish new results regarding convergence to Nash-optimal outcomes in a distributed negotiation framework; and we design and test algorithms similar to those applied in combinatorial auctions for computing such an outcome directly.
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| Document type | Conference contribution |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15117-0_9 |
| Published at | http://staff.science.uva.nl/~ulle/pubs/files/RamezaniEndrissAMEC2009.pdf |
| Downloads |
312938.pdf
(Accepted author manuscript)
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