Essays in competition economics

Open Access
Authors
Supervisors
Cosupervisors
Award date 02-10-2020
ISBN
  • 9789036106177
Number of pages 203
Publisher Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute
Organisations
  • Faculty of Law (FdR)
  • Interfacultary Research - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
Competition policy (mededingingsbeleid) aims to preserve well-functioning market competition by restricting the acquisition or abuse of corporate dominance. Competition economics (mededingingseconomie) looks at the economics behind this. This dissertation consists of four separate essays in competition economics. The first two essays use microeconomic theory and simulations to look at two novel competition concerns: algorithmic collusion and financial benchmark rate collusion. The third essay revisits classic cartel theory to show how results on cartel stability change when assuming firms require a margin before colluding. The last essay reviews event studies in merger analysis and provides a novel application using Hoberg-Phillips TNIC data to argue that U.S. merger control may have been too lenient.
Document type PhD thesis
Note Tinbergen institute research series, no. 766
Language English
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