Political trust: Pillar or peril for democracy Empirical tests of the consequences of political trust on individuals' attitudes and behaviors

Open Access
Authors
Supervisors
Cosupervisors
Award date 28-01-2025
ISBN
  • 9789465068022
Number of pages 289
Organisations
  • Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) - Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR)
Abstract
Democracies rely on trust to function effectively. In representative democracies citizens entrust political leaders to make sound decisions on their behalf and trust that political institutions operate fairly. Political leaders, in turn, depend on this trust to implement difficult decisions without relying solely on force. For these reasons a lack of trust in politics is often seen as a peril to democracy. But how concerned should we be about low political trust? After all, democracies also rely on a healthy dose of skepticism, which helps citizens keep government actors accountable.
Despite its importance, little empirical research has directly examined the consequences of low and declining political trust on the stability and quality of democratic governments. This dissertation addresses this gap by asking:
Which effects do low and declining political trust have on people’s attitudes and behaviours toward democracy?
The chapters in this dissertation show that low and declining political trust does not lead to apathy or withdrawal from politics. Instead, it motivates citizens to: (1) take control of decision-making processes by direct selection of leaders or support for referenda. It (2) incentivizes participation to make one’s voice heard and (3) it induces a higher tolerance to challenge established laws.
Low and declining political trust generates a desire for change among the public. It offers leaders an opportunity to channel citizens’ grievances and reshape the status quo. Whether this strengthens or weakens democracy, however, depends in large part on what political leaders make of this opportunity.
Document type PhD thesis
Language English
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