Contempt, like any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment
| Authors |
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| Publication date | 30-10-2017 |
| Journal | Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
| Article number | e237 |
| Volume | Issue number | 40 |
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| Abstract | Gervais and Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude), but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, as many other emotions, can be both an emotion and sentiment. |
| Document type | Comment/Letter to the editor |
| Note | Open Peer Commentary to: M.M. Gervais, Daniel M.T. Fessler (2017) On the deep structure of social affect: Attitudes, emotions, sentiments, and the case of “contempt”, In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40:e225. |
| Language | English |
| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X16000765
(Final published version)
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