Authority, Legitimacy, and Fragmentation in the (Envisaged) Dispute Settlement Disciplines in Mega-Regionals
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| Publication date | 2017 |
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| Book title | Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA |
| Book subtitle | New Orientations for EU External Economic Relations |
| ISBN |
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| Series | International Economic Law Series |
| Pages (from-to) | 111-150 |
| Publisher | Oxford: Oxford University Press |
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| Abstract |
This chapter analyses the inter-state and investor-state dispute settlement disciplines included in mega-regionals, focusing on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It argues that dispute settlement assumes a pivotal role in trade and investment negotiations, raising fundamental questions about authority and legitimacy and concerns of fragmentation. While preferences of states participating in mega-regionals coincide in agreeing on inter-state arbitration as a compliance mechanism that minimises the authority of dispute resolvers and negative effects of fragmentation in relation to the World Trade Organization, starker differences arise on investor-state dispute settlement. Whereas the EU pushes for the creation of permanent judicial bodies, other states seemingly prefer a reformed version of investor-state arbitration. The underlying clash of ideologies shapes what may become a constitutional moment for international economic law as the debates about the reform of investment dispute settlement progress.
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| Document type | Chapter |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198808893.003.0005 |
| Published at | https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932810 |
| Downloads |
SSRN-id2932810
(Accepted author manuscript)
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