Resisting moral wiggle room: How robust is reciprocal behavior?

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2014
Journal American Economic Journal. Microeconomics
Volume | Issue number 6 | 3
Pages (from-to) 256-264
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior.
Document type Article
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.3.256
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vanderweele2014 (Final published version)
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