Do conditional benefits reduce equilibrium unemployment?

Authors
Publication date 2006
Journal Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume | Issue number 8 | 4
Pages (from-to) 603-610
Number of pages 8
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
Although unconditional unemployment benefits destroy jobs in competitive and noncompetitive labor markets, conditional benefits can spur job growth in noncompetitive labor markets. Unconditional benefits reduce the penalty of shirking and misconduct, while conditional benefits increase this penalty. This is shown for the efficiency-wage, no-shirking model of the labor market developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Switching from unconditional to conditional benefits lowers unemployment. Tough eligibility requirements are thus important components of the welfare state. However, if conditional benefits are financed by a payroll tax, conditional benefits exert upward wage pressure so that unemployment falls by less and may even increase.

Document type Article
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00280.x
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