Structural lobbying power? An exploration of patterns in preference attainment at varying levels of lobbying activity

Studies of lobbying typically look at the extent to which interest groups realize political goals on issues they actively lobby for. Little is known, however, about the extent to which interest groups attain their political goals without making an active lobbying effort. In this paper, we analyze potential biases in perceived preference attainment at different levels of lobbying activity, including analyses among organizations which do not, or hardly, lobby. Empirically, we rely on a cross-national survey conducted among interest group leaders in 8 polities in Europe during the Covid-19 pandemic. Our dataset includes information about issue mobilization and perceived preference attainment on Covid-19 policies and non-Covid-related policies. We find that larger organizations enjoy higher levels of perceived preference attainment, even when they lobby little. In the Covid-19 case, we also see biases in favor of business groups and economically more important sectors. These results document a form of structural power, where decision-making automatically favors some economically important interests.