Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources
| Authors |
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| Publication date | 2022 |
| Host editors |
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| Book title | Multi-Agent Systems |
| Book subtitle | 19th European Conference, EUMAS 2022, Düsseldorf, Germany, September 14–16, 2022 : proceedings |
| ISBN |
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| ISBN (electronic) |
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| Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Event | 19th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2022 |
| Pages (from-to) | 330-347 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Publisher | Cham: Springer |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract | We put forward a formal model of participatory budgeting where projects can incur costs with respect to several different resources, such as money, energy, or emission allowances. We generalise several well-known mechanisms from the usual single-resource setting to this multi-resource setting and analyse their algorithmic efficiency, the extent to which they are immune to strategic manipulation, and the degree of proportional representation they can guarantee. We also prove a general impossibility theorem establishing the incompatibility of proportionality and strategyproofness for this model. |
| Document type | Conference contribution |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_19 |
| Downloads |
978-3-031-20614-6_19
(Final published version)
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