Games regional actors play: dependency, regionalism, and integration theory for the Global South

Prevailing integration theories suffer from Eurocentrism and cannot be applied to developing regions, because they implicitly rely on intraregional economic inter-dependence as a driving force for regional integration. This article starts from the observation that intraregional economic interdependence is low and dependence on extra-regional economic relations is high in the Global South. The aim of regional integration in developing regions is not the liberalisation and regulation of intrare-gional trade, rather an effort to improve the regions’ competitiveness on the global market. Well-integrated developing regions may attract more extra-regional invest-ment inflows and negotiate better access to extra-regional export markets, but the regional member states also compete with each other for their respective shares in extra-regional investment and trade. Dominant regional powers may do better in this competition if they act unilaterally and strive for privileged economic relations with extra-regional partners. As a result, the respective member states defect and regional integration is stalled. Case studies of MERCOSUR and SADC confirm that Bra-zil and South Africa protected their privileged positions during the last 15 years. In contrast, ASEAN is not dominated by a regional power and economic integra-tion has proceeded due to the gains from extra-regional cooperation within the ASEAN + 3 framework.