Choosing Voting Systems for Two-Tier Voting Behind the Veil of Ignorance: An Experiment

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 30-03-2014
Series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2014-042/I
Number of pages 58
Publisher Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
Abstract
There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, with each group represented by a single person. A natural question is what voting system such a committee should use. Concepts based on voting power provide guidelines for this choice. The two most prominent concepts require the Banzhaf power index to be proportional to the square root of group size or the Shapley-Shubik power index to be proportional to group size. Instead of studying the choice of voting systems based on such theoretical concepts, in this paper, I ask which systems individuals actually prefer. To answer this question, I design a laboratory experiment in which participants choose voting systems. I find that people behind the veil of ignorance prefer voting systems following the rule of proportional Shapley-Shubik power; in front of the veil subjects prefer voting systems benefiting their own group. Participants’ choices can only partially be explained by utility maximization or other outcome based concepts.
Document type Working paper
Note Published on 14-2-17 under the title “Choosing the rules: Preferences over voting systems for assemblies of representatives” in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.016
Language English
Published at https://papers.tinbergen.nl/14042.pdf
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