The open empirical cycle for hypothesis evaluation in psychology

Open Access
Authors
  • Herbert Hoijtink
  • Jonathan de Bruin
  • Sascha Duken
  • Jacques Flores
Publication date 2026
Journal Meta-Psychology
Volume | Issue number 10
Number of pages 12
Organisations
  • Faculty of Science (FNWI) - Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics (IBED)
Abstract
In the last decade it has become clear that replicability of empirical psychological research should be better. Open science practices aim to enhance the transparency and accessibility of research thereby both enabling others to reproduce the results presented in a paper and increasing the replicability of these results. Examples of these practices include preregistration, publication of data and analyses, open access publications, and replication research. Although open science practices are gaining traction, they have rarely been placed in a broader epistemological context. To address this shortcoming, this paper introduces the open empirical cycle. It draws upon De Groot’s empirical cycle, a model of cumulative knowledge generation via scientific research and adds open science practices. Adhering to the open empirical cycle, if only partly, will structure the scientific workflow and create awareness of the adverse consequences of deviations. Following the open empirical cycle increases the transparency, quality, trustworthiness, and replicability of research.
Document type Article
Note Tutorial
Language English
Published at
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/wsxbh_v3 (Accepted author manuscript)
https://doi.org/10.15626/MP.2023.3963 (Final published version)
Published at
Downloads
Galley_MP_2023_3963_Hoijtink (Final published version)
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