Supervisory arrangements, LOLR and crisis management in a single European banking market

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2006
Series Working Paper Universiteit van Amsterdam
Number of pages 18
Publisher Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
Organisations
  • Interfacultary Research - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
Abstract In this paper I discuss some key issues related to supervisory arrangements in the EMU countries, and particularly those relating to the LOLR structure and crisis management. The focus will be on the responsibilities and powers of individual countries (and national central banks) vis-à-vis those at the European level (EU and ECB). In this context various issues will be raised relating to the effectiveness and efficiency of the arrangements, and specifically the role and positioning of the lender of last resort (LOLR) in light of the fragmented supervisory structure.
Document type Working paper
Published at http://www.accf.nl/pages/members/Riksbank-April21-2006-paper-AWABOOT.pdf
Downloads
305fulltext.pdf (Submitted manuscript)
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