Strategic delegation improves cartel stability
| Authors | |
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| Publication date | 2010 |
| Series | Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper, 2010-15 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Publisher | Amsterdam: Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract | Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show how strategic delegation in the one-shot Cournot game reduces firm profits. However, with infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation allows for an improvement in cartel stability compared to the infinitely repeated standard Cournot game, thereby actually increasing profits. |
| Document type | Working paper |
| Note | December 2010 |
| Language | English |
| Published at | http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1729144_code503951.pdf?abstractid=1729144&mirid=1 |
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