China & GDP Unraveling the country’s complex relationship with a powerful indicator

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is ubiquitous in political and economic analysis. It shapes how we define our economy, what we value in it and how we assess policies or politicians’ performance. Considering China, economic development has been almost exclusively defined through the lens of GDP and the indicator is deeply integrated in national and local policymaking. Yet, we know little about how and why China adopted GDP measurement, where its GDP target comes from, how the indicator is criticized or whether Chinese stakeholders have influence over its measurement standards. This thesis unravels these different dimensions of China’s relationship with the indicator and examines the politics of GDP in China. First, the adoption of GDP measurement in China was shaped by domestic political ideas about economic reforms as well as practical constraints regarding the diffusion of national accounting standards. Second, GDP’s institutionalization in China’s governance system stems from the symbolic function Chinese politicians attributed to the indicator, representing the CCP’s legitimacy. Third, in China criticism of GDP mainly focuses on its pathologies as a governance tool and shapes the development of new indicators. Fourth, the expert-driven nature of international statistical standard-setting raises barriers for engagement for Chinese statisticians, limiting their ability to influence statistical standard-setting. Unraveling China’s relationship with GDP shows us the indicator’s resilience as a policymaking tool and source of legitimacy in China. Furthermore, it demonstrates the ability of macroeconomic indicators to adjust to different political contexts and contributes to our understanding of who holds power over international standard-setting.