Memory‐Based Deception Detection: Extending the Cognitive Signature of Lying From Instructed to Self‐Initiated Cheating

From a cognitive perspective, lying can be regarded as a complex cognitive process requiring the interplay of several executive functions. Meta-analytic research on 114 studies encompassing 3,307 participants (Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, & Crombez, ) suggests that computerized paradigms can reliably assess the cognitive burden of lying, with large reaction time differences between lying and truth telling. These studies, however, lack a key ingredient of real-life deception, namely self-initiated behavior. Research participants have typically been instructed to commit a mock crime and conceal critical information, whereas in real life, people freely choose whether or not to engage in antisocial behavior. In this study, participants (n = 433) engaged in a trivia quiz and were provided with a monetary incentive for high accuracy performance. Participants were randomly allocated to either a condition where they were instructed to cheat on the quiz (mimicking the typical laboratory set-up) or to a condition in which they were provided with the opportunity to cheat, yet without explicit instructions to do so. Assessments of their response times in a subsequent Concealed Information Test (CIT) revealed that both instructed cheaters (n = 107) and self-initiated cheaters (n = 142) showed the expected RT-slowing for concealed information. The data indicate that the cognitive signature of lying is not restricted to explicitly instructed cheating, but it can also be observed for self-initiated cheating. These findings are highly encouraging from an ecological validity perspective.