The Case for a European Credit Council Historical and Constitutional Fine-Tuning
| Authors | |
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| Publication date | 11-2024 |
| Journal | Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium |
| Volume | Issue number | 14 | 4 |
| Pages (from-to) | 519-532 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract |
Eric Monnet’s European Credit Council (ECC) is an innovative, historically grounded institutional proposal for supporting the ECB in the design of its monetary policy operations. In this commentary, I seek to strengthen the case for the European Credit Council drawing on work in progress on the history of the ECB. I first discuss the tradition of moderate interventionism as it appears in Monnet’s (Monnet, E. (2018). Controlling credit: Central banking and the planned economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973. Cambridge University Press) study Controlling Credit. I show that the model of moderate interventionism was well-known to the drafters of the ECB statutes and efforts to categorically rule such policies out were simply unsuccessful. I suggest that this fortuitous choice has left ample legal space in the EU treaties for an ECC.
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| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0074 |
| Downloads |
10.1515_ael-2022-0074
(Final published version)
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