The Case for a European Credit Council Historical and Constitutional Fine-Tuning

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 11-2024
Journal Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium
Volume | Issue number 14 | 4
Pages (from-to) 519-532
Number of pages 14
Organisations
  • Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) - Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR)
Abstract
Eric Monnet’s European Credit Council (ECC) is an innovative, historically grounded institutional proposal for supporting the ECB in the design of its monetary policy operations. In this commentary, I seek to strengthen the case for the European Credit Council drawing on work in progress on the history of the ECB. I first discuss the tradition of moderate interventionism as it appears in Monnet’s (Monnet, E. (2018). Controlling credit: Central banking and the planned economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973. Cambridge University Press) study Controlling Credit. I show that the model of moderate interventionism was well-known to the drafters of the ECB statutes and efforts to categorically rule such policies out were simply unsuccessful. I suggest that this fortuitous choice has left ample legal space in the EU treaties for an ECC.
Document type Article
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2022-0074
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10.1515_ael-2022-0074 (Final published version)
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