Global justice in complex moral worlds: dilemmas of contextualized theories

In this brief criticism I discuss the complexities of practical judgements on global justice and spell out important agreements with David Miller: (a) global and special - particularly national - obligations are in serious tension; (b) both simple 'global egalitarianism' and 'domestic justice' are morally counter-intuitive; and (c) moral minimalism is the most promising theoretical and practical strategy. Complex moral theories, however, are confronted with three serious dilemmas: (1) how to compare, measure, and weigh conflicting obligations; (2) how to make global moral responsibilities really bite; and (3) how to best address the problem of an adequate allocation of global obligations. As a consequence of his fairly traditional way of doing political philosophy, Miller's answers have serious shortcomings. I argue for a departure from the entrenched division of labour between moral or political philosophy and the social sciences. I opt for an institutional turn in political theory and for institutional pluralism. A multi-level and multi-layered institutionalist approach is more appropriate to realize the fulfilment of the global minimum in the real world.