Tarski's hidden theory of meaning: Sentences say exactly one thing
| Authors | |
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| Publication date | 2008 |
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| Book title | Unity, truth and the liar: The modern relevance of medieval solutions to the liar paradox |
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| Series | Logic, epistemology and the unity of science, 8 |
| Pages (from-to) | 41-63 |
| Number of pages | 338 |
| Publisher | Dordrecht: Springer |
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| Abstract | I argue that Tarski's truth schema (T) concerns meaning just as much as it concerns truth. Better said, (T) implicitly presupposes a theory of meaning; it rests on a simple and yet contentious assumption, namely what Andjelković and Williamson [1] have termed the principle of uniformity (U): every sentence of a language says exactly one thing. I here challenge the validity of (U), and, insofar as (U) is a necessary condition for the validity of (T), I conclude that (T) is false. |
| Document type | Chapter |
| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8468-3_3
(Final published version)
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