Truthful resolutions: A new perspective on false-answer sensitivity

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2016
Journal Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory
Event Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26, 2016
Volume | Issue number 26
Pages (from-to) 122-141
Organisations
  • Interfacultary Research - Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
  • Faculty of Science (FNWI)
Abstract

Responsive verbs like know embed both declarative and interrogative complements. Standard accounts of such verbs are reductive: they assume that whether an individual stands in a knowledge-wh relation to a question is determined by whether she stands in a knowledge-that relation to some answer to the question. George (2013) observed that knowledge-wh, however, not only depends on knowledge-that but also on false belief---a fact that reductive accounts can't capture.

We develop an account that is not reductive but uniform: it assumes a single entry for interrogative-embedding and declarative-embedding uses of a responsive verb. The key insight that allows us to capture the false-belief dependency of knowledge-wh is that verbs like know are sensitive to both true and false answers to the embedded question. Formally, this is achieved through a novel, fine-grained way of representing the meaning of a clausal complement in terms of so-called truthful resolutions. The resulting analysis gives us a unifying perspective, under which false-answer sensitivity comes out as a general characteristic common to all levels of exhaustivity.

Document type Article
Note Proceedings of the 26th Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference, held at the University of Texas at Austin May 12-15, 2016, edited by Mary Moroney, Carol-Rose Little, Jacob Collard, and Dan Burgdorf.
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.3765/salt.v26i0.3791
Downloads
3791-5177-1-PB (Final published version)
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