Modeling Financial Incentives to Get the Unemployed Back to Work
| Authors |
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|---|---|
| Publication date | 2006 |
| Journal | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics |
| Volume | Issue number | 162 | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 227-252 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract |
We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. We find that benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across-the-board reduction in the replacement rate, for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed. We decompose the effects of a sanction system into micro, crowding-out, spillover, and tax effects. (JEL: H 55, J 65, J 68) |
| Document type | Article |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1628/093245606777583576 |
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