Quantal response models in step-level public good games
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| Publication date | 1998 |
| Journal | European Journal of Political Economy |
| Volume | Issue number | 14 | 1 |
| Pages (from-to) | 89-100 |
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| Abstract | The effect of adding noise to both an equilibrium model and a naive Bayesian model of behavior in step-level public good games is studied. Quantal response equilibria are derived for these games and a naive Bayesian quantal response function is presented. The models are fit for experimental data from such a game and compared. The results seem more promising for the naive Bayesian model than for the equilibrium model. |
| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00044-X
(Final published version)
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