Voting by Axioms (Extended Abstract)
| Authors |
|
|---|---|
| Publication date | 2024 |
| Host editors |
|
| Book title | Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
| Book subtitle | Jeju, Korea : 3-9 August 2024 |
| ISBN |
|
| ISBN (electronic) |
|
| Series | IJCAI |
| Event | 33rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2024 |
| Volume | Issue number | 11 |
| Pages (from-to) | 8455-8459 |
| Publisher | Marina del Rey, CA: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence |
| Organisations |
|
| Abstract | We develop an approach for collective decision making from first principles. In this approach, rather than using a---necessarily imperfect---voting rule to map any given scenario where individual agents report their preferences into a collective decision, we identify for every concrete such scenario the most appealing set of normative principles (known as axioms in social choice theory) that would entail a unique decision and then implement that decision. We analyse some of the fundamental properties of this new approach, from both an algorithmic and a normative point of view. |
| Document type | Conference contribution |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/941 |
| Other links | https://www.proceedings.com/76457.html |
| Downloads |
0941
(Final published version)
|
| Permalink to this page | |
