Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

Authors
Publication date 2008
Journal Economic Journal
Volume | Issue number 118 | 525
Pages (from-to) 192-214
Number of pages 23
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract We use experiments to study the efficiency effects of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a spot market. We focus on the strategic implications of a forward market and consider both quantity and supply function competition. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market to the introduction of an additional competitor. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.
Document type Article
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02109.x
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