The distinction between non-legal and legal norms in international affairs an analysis with reference to international policy for the protection of the North Sea from hazardous substances

The purpose of this article is to examine certain questions related to the distinction between non-legal and legal norms. This distinction, identified by Manfred Lachs as 'the threshold in law-making', is as old as the phenomenon of international law itself. In some cases states choose to concert their actions by non-legal norms; in other cases by legal norms; and in a not insignificant number of cases by norms with a somewhat unclear legal status. This article will attempt to shed some more light on the question what is the (legal) value of norms before they have crossed the threshold of law-making, and what may change thereafter. The analysis will mostly proceed in an empirical and inductive manner. While there are important theoretical issues underlying the analysis, it is hoped that by providing practical examples of the relevance (or lack thereof) of the distinction, the article may enhance our understanding of the issue. The empirical material for this article is taken from an issue area that one might call a laboratory for the problems related to the threshold in law-making: the international policy for the protection of the North Sea. This article will briefly outline this policy and its use of non-legal norms. Finally, the article will discuss what happens once norms have crossed the threshold of law-making.