The Prediction Value
| Authors |
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| Publication date | 02-2017 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | Issue number | 48 | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 433-460 |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract |
We introduce the prediction value (PV) of player i as the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S) when i
cooperates or not in a probabilistic TU game. The latter combines a
standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of
coalitions. The PV reflects the importance of information about a given
player’s behavior for predicting, e.g., committee decisions that are
subject to opinion interdependencies. The PV is characterized by
anonymity, linearity, a consistency requirement and two normalization
conditions. Every multinomial probabilistic value, hence every binomial
semivalue, coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability
distributions. So the PV can be regarded as a power index in specific
cases. Conversely, some semivalues—including the Banzhaf but not the
Shapley value—can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.
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| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Related publication | The Prediction Value |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1012-x |
| Downloads |
Prediction
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