Reference and denotation

Authors
Publication date 2018
Host editors
  • S.O. Hansson
  • V.F. Hendricks
Book title Introduction to Formal Philosophy
ISBN
  • 9783319774336
ISBN (electronic)
  • 9783319774343
Series Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy
Pages (from-to) 289-296
Publisher Cham: Springer
Organisations
  • Faculty of Science (FNWI)
  • Interfacultary Research - Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
Abstract
According to Frege, the meaning of an expression is the description that helps language users to determine what its reference is. Natural as the view might seem, it gives rise to the conceptual problem that it presupposes that we already know the meaning of the terms used in the description (Wittgenstein, Quine), and it is empirically incorrect because ‘having a correct description in mind’ is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for successful reference (Kripke, Kaplan). Perhaps reference for at least some times is non-descriptive, and depends on context. Anaphora have a referential use as well, picking up the speaker’s referent of an earlier used indefinite description. The challenge of this view is to provide a satisfactory analysis of so-called donkey-sentences.
Document type Chapter
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_13
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