Reference and denotation
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Publication date | 2018 |
| Host editors |
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| Book title | Introduction to Formal Philosophy |
| ISBN |
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| ISBN (electronic) |
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| Series | Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy |
| Pages (from-to) | 289-296 |
| Publisher | Cham: Springer |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract |
According to Frege, the meaning of an expression is the description that
helps language users to determine what its reference is. Natural as the
view might seem, it gives rise to the conceptual problem that it presupposes that we already know the meaning of the terms used in the description (Wittgenstein, Quine), and it is empirically incorrect
because ‘having a correct description in mind’ is neither a sufficient
nor a necessary condition for successful reference (Kripke, Kaplan).
Perhaps reference for at least some times is non-descriptive, and
depends on context. Anaphora have a referential use as well, picking up
the speaker’s referent of an earlier used indefinite description. The
challenge of this view is to provide a satisfactory analysis of
so-called donkey-sentences.
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| Document type | Chapter |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_13 |
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