Do not trash the incentive! Monetary incentives and waste sorting
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| Publication date | 2011 |
| Series | HBS working paper, 11-093 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Publisher | Boston, MA: Harvard Business School |
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| Abstract |
This paper examines whether monetary incentives are an effective tool for increasing domestic waste sorting. We exploit the exogenous variation in the pricing systems experienced during the 1999-2008 decade by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). We estimate with a panel analysis that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive-based schemes increase by 12.2% the ratio of sorted to total waste. This increase reflects a change in the behavior of households, who keep unaltered the production of total waste but sort it to a larger extent. In addition, we show that several factors that may discourage local administrators from adopting PAYT - illegal dumping and higher cost of management - are not important at the aggregate level. Hence, our results support the use of PAYT as an effective tool to increase waste sorting.
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| Document type | Working paper |
| Language | English |
| Published at | http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers1011.html#wp11-093 |
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