Evolution of reciprocity in asymmetric international environmental negotiations
| Authors |
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| Publication date | 2013 |
| Series | CeNDEF Working Paper, 13-09 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Publisher | Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam |
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| Abstract | We study the evolutionary success of a generalised trigger strategy within an asymmetric, n-player Prisoner's Dilemma environment, with application to the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space - i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction - such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas. |
| Document type | Working paper |
| Note | 24th September 2013 |
| Language | English |
| Published at | http://www1.fee.uva.nl/cendef/publications/papers/ReciprocityAsymmPD-Sept24-final.pdf |
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Evolution of reciprocity in asymmetric international environmental negotiations
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