The European Fiscal Board Supranational de novo body or orchestrator?

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Authors
Publication date 11-2021
Journal Rivista italiana di scienza politica
Volume | Issue number 51 | 3
Pages (from-to) 389-403
Organisations
  • Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) - Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR)
Abstract
The European Fiscal Board (EFB) is a supranational fiscal council advising the European Commission on the European Union (EU) fiscal framework. It was created as a response to the EU member states' repeated non-compliance with the EU fiscal rules and the emergence of national fiscal councils. Non-compliance with EU fiscal rules was often left unpunished and required a new expert body to regain some of the lost credibility of the EU's fiscal framework through enhanced fiscal monitoring. This article argues that the European Commission created the EFB in response to the new intergovernmental dynamics. A supranational fiscal watchdog that depends on the Commission for financial resources and access to information would deflect member states from delegating more competences away from the Commission. Thus, the Commission was able to counter a potential threat to its authority in EU fiscal governance by creating a supranational de novo body that it controlled.
Document type Article
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2021.9
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The European Fiscal Board (Final published version)
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