A neo-Aristotelian notion of reciprocity: about civic friendship and (the troublesome character of) right judicial decisions

This chapter argues that a neo-Aristotelian approach can play a valuable role in accounting for reciprocity in adjudication. It can solve the central flaws that an "adjudication as applied moral theory" approach faces. In addition, the author asserts that a neo-Aristotelian approach to adjudication needs the concept of civic friendship in order to really account for reciprocity in adjudication. Citizens will have a reason to accept the painful burden of a particular judicial decision if the decision is made by a judge who is both judicially wise and a civic friend.
It will be shown that this neo-Aristotelian approach comes with a "troublesome" judicial phenomenology. Both the judge and the losing party will be confronted with the inescapable limits of reciprocity. Not only will the actual grounds of judicial decisions remain to some extent inarticulate, also, these decisions will sometimes come with a genuine moral loss.