On rational delegations in liquid democracy
| Authors |
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|---|---|
| Publication date | 2019 |
| Book title | Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Thirty-First Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, The Ninth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence |
| Book subtitle | AAAI-19, IAAI-19, EAAI-20 : January 27-February 1, 2019, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA |
| ISBN (electronic) |
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| Series | Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
| Event | 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
| Pages (from-to) | 1796-1803 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Publisher | Palo Alto, California: AAAI Press |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract |
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group's accuracy on variously structured social networks. |
| Document type | Conference contribution |
| Language | English |
| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796
(Final published version)
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| Other links | |
| Permalink to this page | |
