A generic approach to coalition formation
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| Publication date | 2009 |
| Journal | International Game Theory Review |
| Volume | Issue number | 11 | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 347-367 |
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| Abstract | We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games. |
| Document type | Article |
| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198909002352
(Final published version)
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