A generic approach to coalition formation

Authors	K.R. Apt A. Witzel
Publication date	2009
Journal	International Game Theory Review
Volume | Issue number	11 | 3
Pages (from-to)	347-367
Organisations	Interfacultary Research - Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
Abstract	We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.
Document type	Article
Published at	https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198909002352
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