A model of procedural and distributive fairness

This paper presents a new model aimed at predicting behav-
ior in games involving a randomized allocation procedure. It is designed to
capture the relative importance and interaction between procedural justice
(defined crudely in terms of the share of one's expected outcome in the sum
of all expected outcomes) and distributive justice (reflecting the relation of
the actual outcome to the sum of all outcomes). The model is applied to
10 experimental games, including "randomized" variations of simple sequential
bargaining games, and delivers qualitatively correct predictions. I also show
that in view of the model redistribution of income can be seen as a substitute
for (lacking) vertical social mobility. This contributes to the explanation of
greater demand for redistribution in European countries vis-a-vis the United
15 States. I conclude with suggestions for further verifcation of the model and
possible extensions.