It Takes an Art of Transformation Critical Theory and Feelings

As in philosophy in general, Critical Theory is not good with feelings. On the one hand, this is not surprising, because Critical Theory is essentially concerned with the problem of legitimizing critique, i.e., with the question of how critique can be justified, and this justification is based on reason as the epitome of justification. On the other hand, the situation is very surprising, because it is an essential part of the self-conception of Critical Theory to present an expanded concept of reason that is not rationalistically limited. The article aims to address this astonishing emotional indeterminacy in Critical Theory. Starting from the founding fathers, it will focus on more recent developments, all of which refer to Jürgen Habermas’ refoundation of Critical Theory. They open up new approaches as to the significance of feelings, but remain in the realm of missed opportunities. In contrast, the lecture concludes by arguing for a thesis that persists within Critical Theory: the expansion of reason requires a translation or transformation of feelings. As far as feelings are concerned, Critical Theory does not mean a theory of exclusion or separation, but a theory of integration, and this specific integration cannot succeed without going back to patterns of aesthetics.