Governing Sovereign Risk in the Euro Area: Law and politics of the ECB’s collateral and market stabilisation framework

Open Access
Authors
  • N. de Boer ORCID logo
  • Philipp Kriele-Orphal
  • Charlotte Rommerskirchen
  • Agnieszka Smoleńska
  • Ludovic Suttor-Sorel
Publication date December 2025
ISBN
  • ISBN 978-92-848-3189-0
ISBN (electronic)
  • ISBN 978-92-848-3188-3
Series Monetary Dialogue Papers, December 2025
Number of pages 39
Publisher Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit, European Parliament
Organisations
  • Faculty of Law (FdR) - Amsterdam Center for European Law and Governance (ACELG)
  • Faculty of Law (FdR)
Abstract
This paper analyses the ECB’s treatment of sovereign debt in its collateral framework and market stabilisation instruments. The ECB’s treatment of sovereign debt sits at the core of Europe’s financial stability, yet its legal mandate leaves the central bank with wide discretion. This paper analyses the political stakes and design choices in the ECB’s sovereign debt policies and how the European Parliament can respond. The European Parliament can enhance the democratic legitimacy of the ECB’s approach to sovereign debt by demanding more transparency, ensuring presence in key fora shaping sovereign-debt governance, as well as by deepening its guidance on the secondary mandate. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 3 December 2025.
Document type Report
Language English
Published at
https://doi.org/10.2861/8569142 (Final published version)
Downloads
ECTI_STU(2025)773736_EN (1) (Final published version)
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