Judgment Aggregation
| Authors |
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| Publication date | 2024 |
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| Book title | Economics and Computation |
| Book subtitle | An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division |
| ISBN |
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| ISBN (electronic) |
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| Series | Classroom Companion: Economics |
| Edition | 2nd |
| Pages (from-to) | 467-504 |
| Publisher | Cham: Springer |
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| Abstract | In Chapters 4–6, we were concerned with making collective decisions by voting, i.e., with methods for how to aggregate the voters’ individual preferences so as to determine the winning alternative(s) as a collective consensus. In the present chapter, we turn to the closely related topic of judgment aggregation, i.e., to methods for how to aggregate the individual judgments of a number of judges so as to determine the joint judgment(s) as a collective consensus. |
| Document type | Chapter |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-60099-9_7 |
| Downloads |
978-3-031-60099-9_7-1
(Final published version)
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