Carrots vs. Sticks
| Authors |
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| Publication date | 2017 |
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| Book title | Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. - Volume 1 |
| Book subtitle | Methodology and concepts |
| ISBN |
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| Pages (from-to) | 439-465 |
| Publisher | Oxford: Oxford University Press |
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| Abstract |
This article draws a general picture of the differences between the metaphors of carrots and sticks. It discusses incentive effects (in principle, a $100 carrot creates the same incentives as a $100 stick, but there are exceptions); transaction costs (carrots are paid upon compliance, sticks upon violation, therefore sticks have lower transaction costs if the majority complies); risks (probabilistic carrots create risks for compliers, probabilistic sticks for violators); wealth and budget constraints (the maximum carrot depends on the principal's wealth, the maximum stick on the agent's wealth, but sticks can have a multiplication effect); distributive effects (carrots may overcompensate, sticks may undercompensate; individualizing sanctions changes the distributive effect of carrots but not of sticks); activity level effects caused by these distributive effects; the principal's incentives to behave opportunistically; and the agent's incentives to self-report. The article also discusses special types (precompensated, annullable, combined, intra-group financed, reversible, strict liability carrots and sticks) and two extensions (political risks, behavioural effects).
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| Document type | Chapter |
| Language | English |
| Related publication | Carrots versus sticks |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684267.013.41 |
| Downloads |
SSRN-id1470129
(Accepted author manuscript)
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