Judge bias in labor courts and firm performance

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 06-2024
Journal Journal of the European Economic Association
Volume | Issue number 22 | 3
Pages (from-to) 1319–1366
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.
Document type Article
Note With supplementary files
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad046
Downloads
jvad046 (Final published version)
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