Judge bias in labor courts and firm performance
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| Publication date | 06-2024 |
| Journal | Journal of the European Economic Association |
| Volume | Issue number | 22 | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1319–1366 |
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| Abstract |
This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.
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| Document type | Article |
| Note | With supplementary files |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad046 |
| Downloads |
jvad046
(Final published version)
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